Code analysis

static source read inferred

Static code-analysis findings — hidden prompt content in shipped skill files, committed secrets, dynamic-exec sinks, and suspicious call-home endpoints — across the analyzed catalogue. Heuristic, pure, no code executed; every row deep-links to its source. Click a kind to filter.

analysis coverage 86% of 59,698 analyzable servers
51224 analyzed
7479 re-analysis due
995 not analyzable
0 not yet analyzed
4849 source gone
not analyzable
795 too large 200 no source

Running analyzer v33. The scanner changelog explains what each version detects and when it changed.

code findings 15 shown
  1. MEDIUM suspicious endpoint makerchecker/MakerChecker 172.32.0.1 expect(assertSafeHttpUrl("http://172.32.0.1/x")).toBe("http://172.32.0.1/x"); // just outside /12
  2. MEDIUM suspicious endpoint makerchecker/MakerChecker 8.8.8.8 expect(assertSafeHttpUrl("http://8.8.8.8/x")).toBe("http://8.8.8.8/x");
  3. MEDIUM suspicious endpoint makerchecker/MakerChecker 169.254.169.254 (cloud metadata) "http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/", // cloud metadata
  4. HIGH credential in log makerchecker/MakerChecker credential in log console.log(apiKey.plaintext);
  5. HIGH committed secret makerchecker/MakerChecker private key PEM private key block (redacted)
  6. HIGH dynamic exec jakerusso100-ai/Anvil eval()/exec() return str(eval(expression, {"__builtins__": {}}, {}))
  7. HIGH dynamic exec jakerusso100-ai/Anvil __import__ sink key = __import__("os").environ.get(prov["api_key_env"])
  8. HIGH committed secret necorox-com/kotoji committed .env env file shipped with populated values
  9. HIGH committed secret necorox-com/kotoji Google OAuth client secret GOCSPX…(33 chars, redacted)
  10. MEDIUM suspicious endpoint xAmirHamza77/AntiStrike7.0 169.254.169.254 (cloud metadata) {"payload": "http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/", "type": "cloud", "target": "aws_metadata"},
  11. HIGH dynamic exec rikhinkavuru/calma eval()/exec() exec(compile(code, "<formula>", "exec"), ns) # noqa: S102 - AST-guarded + sandboxed ns; validated; prod=in-VM
  12. HIGH dynamic exec rikhinkavuru/calma eval()/exec() exec(code, ns) # noqa: S102 — the repo's own code, run in the sandbox; the transform only appends a decorator
  13. HIGH committed secret attebury/remogram GitHub token ghs_ey…(40 chars, redacted)
  14. HIGH obfuscation mkarvan/AgentShield base64 decode → exec sink exec(base64.b64decode(b"cHJpbnQoJ2hlbGxvIGZyb20gbWFsaWNpb3VzIHBheWxvYWQnKQ=="))
  15. HIGH dynamic exec mkarvan/AgentShield eval()/exec() exec(base64.b64decode(b"cHJpbnQoJ2hlbGxvIGZyb20gbWFsaWNpb3VzIHBheWxvYWQnKQ=="))