Code analysis
static source read inferred
Static code-analysis findings — hidden prompt content in shipped skill files, committed secrets, dynamic-exec sinks, and suspicious call-home endpoints — across the analyzed catalogue. Heuristic, pure, no code executed; every row deep-links to its source. Click a kind to filter.
51193 analyzed
7507 re-analysis due
995 not analyzable
0 not yet analyzed
4848 source gone
not analyzable
795 too large 200 no source
Running analyzer v33. The scanner changelog explains what each version detects and when it changed.
- hidden prompt 369
- committed secret 6298
- dynamic exec 12007
- obfuscation 3647
- suspicious endpoint 12542
- credential in log 718
- over-broad oauth scope 2556
- suspicious skill script 197
- bundled IDE extension 50
- skill file 190152
- HIGH dynamic exec eren23/attocode __import__ sink
env = {k: v for k, v in __import__("os").environ.items() if k != "OPENAI_API_KEY"} - HIGH dynamic exec eren23/attocode eval()/exec()
exec(compiled, sandbox) # noqa: S102 - HIGH dynamic exec eren23/attocode eval()/exec()
exec(compile(code, 'run.py', 'exec'), {}) - HIGH dynamic exec eren23/attocode __import__ sink
result = __import__("subprocess").run( - HIGH dynamic exec eren23/attocode eval()/exec()
result = eval(user_input) # expect: security/python_dynamic_eval - HIGH dynamic exec eren23/attocode marshal.loads()
return marshal.loads(data) # expect: security/python_marshal_loads - HIGH dynamic exec eren23/attocode unsafe yaml.load()
return yaml.load(data) # expect: security/python_yaml_unsafe - HIGH dynamic exec eren23/attocode pickle.loads()
return pickle.loads(data) # expect: security/python_pickle_loads - HIGH committed secret eren23/attocode committed .env
env file shipped with populated values - HIGH dynamic exec IQZZ020501/NexaFlow __import__()
embeddings = __import__( - MEDIUM suspicious endpoint IQZZ020501/NexaFlow 8.8.8.8
asyncio.run(validate_mcp_destination("http://8.8.8.8/mcp", False)) - HIGH dynamic exec ymiya55/freecad-fem-mcp __import__()
module = __import__( - HIGH obfuscation tanvoid0/llmwire dynamic require()/import()
await import(${JSON.stringify('file:///' + entry.replace(/\\/g, '/'))}); - HIGH committed secret scm-crawler-mcp-server committed .env
env file shipped with populated values - MEDIUM suspicious endpoint serbyte-development/shellby-mcp custom.ngrok.app
await writeFile(configPath, 'workspace = "~/Custom"\n\n[ngrok]\nurl = "https://custom.ngrok.app"\npooling_enabled = true\n')