MCP server exposing Credda's verifiable, bias-free trust layer to AI agents: check a counterparty's Credda trust before transacting, verify a credential they present to you, and mint your own to present back. Wraps existing public /verify endpoints; no sc
- capability exposure inferred + 14
- tool safety inferred + 7
- supply-chain attested + 8
- trust mitigators mixed − 9
attested inferred mixed
The A–E grade is our heuristic synthesis — a "review this" prompt, not a verdict. Each factor is tagged by what backs it: attested (a verifiable record), reported (a third party's claim), or inferred (our own heuristic, e.g. permissions). See methodology.
grade last moved 4d ago · see ecosystem CVEs →
- B · 15 → B · 20
- A · 7 → B · 15
- B · 17 → A · 7
- B · 26 → B · 17
- B · 16 → B · 26
No known CVEs for this server.
- medium toxic flow (lethal trifecta)
lethal trifecta reachable across this server's tools: private-data access + untrusted-content ingestion + network exfil
- low exfiltration combo
sensitive read and network capabilities split across this server's tools
- supply-chain +8 supply-chain hub →
[](https://mcpobservatory.com/servers/github:Credda-io/credda-mcp/security) Heuristic, inferred signals — false positives (legitimately powerful tools, forks, language ports) are expected. Treat each as "review this", not a verdict. See the ecosystem-wide picture on the security hub, or the fleet security of Credda-io.