Secure Acceptora verification skill for Codex, Claude Code, and Gemini CLI with MCP, REST, completion gates, and offline recovery.
This grade was produced by analyzer v30 , 3 version s behind the one running now. Detectors added since have not been applied here, so it is not directly comparable with a server analyzed at the current version. A re-scan is queued.
- capability exposure inferred + 10
- tool safety inferred + 5
- trust mitigators mixed − 3
inferred mixed
The A–E grade is our heuristic synthesis — a "review this" prompt, not a verdict. Each factor is tagged by what backs it: attested (a verifiable record), reported (a third party's claim), or inferred (our own heuristic, e.g. permissions). See methodology.
graded 6m ago · see ecosystem CVEs →
- A · 0 → A · 12
No known CVEs for this server.
- medium dangerous code
dynamic exec: eval()/exec()
analyzed commit add5cfb · analyzer v30 · 2w ago
skills & prompt files 1
danger signals1
- dynamic code execution eval()/exec() Elvesora-acceptora-agent-skill-add5cfb/scripts/install.py :1190
exec(compile(_pinned_manifest_builder(git_executable), str(module_path), "exec"), namespace)
[](https://mcpobservatory.com/servers/github:Elvesora/acceptora-agent-skill/security) Heuristic, inferred signals — false positives (legitimately powerful tools, forks, language ports) are expected. Treat each as "review this", not a verdict. See the ecosystem-wide picture on the security hub, or the fleet security of Elvesora.