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- capability exposure inferred + 35
- tool safety inferred + 12
- trust mitigators mixed − 3
inferred mixed
The A–E grade is our heuristic synthesis — a "review this" prompt, not a verdict. Each factor is tagged by what backs it: attested (a verifiable record), reported (a third party's claim), or inferred (our own heuristic, e.g. permissions). See methodology.
grade last moved 3d ago · see ecosystem CVEs →
- C · 56 → C · 44
- D · 64 → C · 56
- C · 56 → D · 64
No known CVEs for this server.
- high dangerous code
committed secret: committed .env · dynamic exec: unsafe yaml.load(), eval()/exec(), __import__ sink, __import__()
- medium dangerous code
env-secret-flows-to-network-py: An environment value reaches a network call. Review whether it is a credential leaving the process; the ordinary API-wrapper shape (read a key, call
- medium dangerous code
env-secret-flows-to-network-py: An environment value reaches a network call. Review whether it is a credential leaving the process; the ordinary API-wrapper shape (read a key, call
- medium dangerous code
env-secret-flows-to-network-py: An environment value reaches a network call. Review whether it is a credential leaving the process; the ordinary API-wrapper shape (read a key, call
- medium dangerous code
env-secret-flows-to-network-js: A process environment value reaches a network call. Review whether it is a credential leaving the process; the ordinary API-wrapper shape (read a ke
- medium dangerous code
env-secret-flows-to-network-js: A process environment value reaches a network call. Review whether it is a credential leaving the process; the ordinary API-wrapper shape (read a ke
- medium dangerous code
env-secret-flows-to-network-js: A process environment value reaches a network call. Review whether it is a credential leaving the process; the ordinary API-wrapper shape (read a ke
- medium dangerous code
env-secret-flows-to-network-js: A process environment value reaches a network call. Review whether it is a credential leaving the process; the ordinary API-wrapper shape (read a ke
analyzed commit 7b086d9 · analyzer v33 · 2d ago
skills & prompt files 11
- agent-rules agentbreeder-agentbreeder-7b086d9/AGENT.md
- agent-rules agentbreeder-agentbreeder-7b086d9/CLAUDE.md
- prompt-file agentbreeder-agentbreeder-7b086d9/examples/ai-news-digest/prompts/ai-news-digest-system.md
- prompt-file agentbreeder-agentbreeder-7b086d9/examples/google-adk-agent/prompts/gemini-assistant-system.md
- prompt-file agentbreeder-agentbreeder-7b086d9/examples/registry-pattern-ts/prompts/ts-greeter-system.md
- agent-rules agentbreeder-agentbreeder-7b086d9/microlearning-ebook-agent/.cursorrules
- agent-rules agentbreeder-agentbreeder-7b086d9/microlearning-ebook-agent/AGENTS.md
- agent-rules agentbreeder-agentbreeder-7b086d9/microlearning-ebook-agent/CLAUDE.md
- prompt-file agentbreeder-agentbreeder-7b086d9/microlearning-ebook-agent/prompts/microlearning-system.md
- agent-rules agentbreeder-agentbreeder-7b086d9/website/AGENTS.md
- agent-rules agentbreeder-agentbreeder-7b086d9/website/CLAUDE.md
danger signals14
- dynamic code execution unsafe yaml.load() agentbreeder-agentbreeder-7b086d9/cli/commands/orchestration.py :154
raw = dict(yaml.load(f)) - dynamic code execution unsafe yaml.load() agentbreeder-agentbreeder-7b086d9/cli/commands/template.py :92
config = yaml.load(f) - dynamic code execution unsafe yaml.load() agentbreeder-agentbreeder-7b086d9/cli/commands/validate.py :143
data = yaml.load(f) - dynamic code execution unsafe yaml.load() agentbreeder-agentbreeder-7b086d9/engine/config_parser.py :420
doc = yaml.load(f) - dynamic code execution unsafe yaml.load() agentbreeder-agentbreeder-7b086d9/engine/orchestration_parser.py :124
doc = yaml.load(f) - dynamic code execution unsafe yaml.load() agentbreeder-agentbreeder-7b086d9/engine/seed/first_boot.py :77
doc = yaml.load(f) - dynamic code execution eval()/exec() agentbreeder-agentbreeder-7b086d9/examples/openai-agents-agent/agent.py :59
result = eval(expression, {"__builtins__": {}}, allowed_names) # noqa: S307 - dynamic code execution unsafe yaml.load() agentbreeder-agentbreeder-7b086d9/registry/agents.py :67
doc = yaml.load(yaml_string) - dynamic code execution eval()/exec() agentbreeder-agentbreeder-7b086d9/templates/langgraph-starter/graph.py :74
result = eval(expression, {"__builtins__": {}}, allowed) # noqa: S307 - dynamic code execution __import__ sink agentbreeder-agentbreeder-7b086d9/tests/unit/test_openai_agents_server.py :123
k: v for k, v in __import__("os").environ.items() if k != "OPENAI_API_KEY" - dynamic code execution __import__() agentbreeder-agentbreeder-7b086d9/tests/unit/test_provisioners.py :79
__import__(_CLOUD_SDK_HINTS[cloud]) - dynamic code execution __import__ sink agentbreeder-agentbreeder-7b086d9/tests/unit/test_quickstart_runtime_diagnostics.py :20
env = {k: v for k, v in __import__("os").environ.items() if k != "DOCKER_HOST"} - suspicious endpoint api.datadoghq.eu (telemetry) agentbreeder-agentbreeder-7b086d9/tests/unit/test_connectors_datadog.py :199
assert connector._base_url == "https://api.datadoghq.eu" - committed secret committed .env agentbreeder-agentbreeder-7b086d9/dashboard/.env.e2e :1
env file shipped with populated values
[](https://mcpobservatory.com/servers/github:agentbreeder/agentbreeder/security) Heuristic, inferred signals — false positives (legitimately powerful tools, forks, language ports) are expected. Treat each as "review this", not a verdict. See the ecosystem-wide picture on the security hub, or the fleet security of agentbreeder.