not analyzable — repository too large to scan in full
A memory of the codebase your AI agent can't get from grep: a persistent call graph, semantic search, and per-symbol review learnings over any repo. Self-hosted MCP server — Go, tree-sitter, Apache AGE.
Source not yet analyzed — this grade rests on attested signals (CVEs, supply-chain) only. It is a floor: reading the code could raise it, not lower it.
- capability exposure inferred + 30
- tool safety inferred + 17
- trust mitigators mixed − 3
inferred mixed
The A–E grade is our heuristic synthesis — a "review this" prompt, not a verdict. Each factor is tagged by what backs it: attested (a verifiable record), reported (a third party's claim), or inferred (our own heuristic, e.g. permissions). See methodology.
graded 5m ago · see ecosystem CVEs →
No known CVEs for this server.
- medium exfiltration combo github_code_search
single tool reads + sends: fs, net
- medium purpose mismatch dataflow
benign-looking name carries shell
- medium toxic flow (lethal trifecta)
lethal trifecta reachable across this server's tools: private-data access + untrusted-content ingestion + network exfil
- low exfiltration combo find_duplicates
single tool reads + sends: net, db
[](https://mcpobservatory.com/servers/github:anatolykoptev/vaelor/security) Heuristic, inferred signals — false positives (legitimately powerful tools, forks, language ports) are expected. Treat each as "review this", not a verdict. See the ecosystem-wide picture on the security hub, or the fleet security of anatolykoptev.