An MCP server that drives a real Android device over ADB and attaches the resulting screen to every action. Single native binary, continuous H.264 vision cache, OCR for screens the accessibility tree cannot read.
- capability exposure inferred + 26
- tool safety inferred + 2
- trust mitigators mixed − 11
inferred mixed
The A–E grade is our heuristic synthesis — a "review this" prompt, not a verdict. Each factor is tagged by what backs it: attested (a verifiable record), reported (a third party's claim), or inferred (our own heuristic, e.g. permissions). See methodology.
grade last moved 10h ago · see ecosystem CVEs →
- B · 25 → B · 17
- B · 28 → B · 25
- B · 16 → B · 28
No known CVEs for this server.
- low exfiltration combo
sensitive read and network capabilities split across this server's tools
[](https://mcpobservatory.com/servers/github:edgecasehuman/droidsight/security) Heuristic, inferred signals — false positives (legitimately powerful tools, forks, language ports) are expected. Treat each as "review this", not a verdict. See the ecosystem-wide picture on the security hub, or the fleet security of edgecasehuman.