Fail-closed image updates for Portainer and Compose. A digest ripens. You apply.
- capability exposure inferred + 6
- tool safety inferred + 12
- trust mitigators mixed − 3
inferred mixed
The A–E grade is our heuristic synthesis — a "review this" prompt, not a verdict. Each factor is tagged by what backs it: attested (a verifiable record), reported (a third party's claim), or inferred (our own heuristic, e.g. permissions). See methodology.
grade last moved 4d ago · see ecosystem CVEs →
- A · 3 → B · 15
- A · 6 → A · 3
No known CVEs for this server.
- high dangerous code
suspicious bundled script in 6 file(s)
analyzed commit 26325c4 · analyzer v33 · 4d ago
skills & prompt files 18
- skill frankieramirez-ripen-26325c4/.agents/skills/attune/SKILL.md
- skill frankieramirez-ripen-26325c4/.agents/skills/augur/SKILL.md
- skill frankieramirez-ripen-26325c4/.agents/skills/banish/SKILL.md
- skill frankieramirez-ripen-26325c4/.agents/skills/cast/SKILL.md
- skill frankieramirez-ripen-26325c4/.agents/skills/conjure/SKILL.md
- skill frankieramirez-ripen-26325c4/.agents/skills/dispel/SKILL.md
- skill frankieramirez-ripen-26325c4/.agents/skills/mend/SKILL.md
- skill frankieramirez-ripen-26325c4/.agents/skills/mimic/SKILL.md
- skill frankieramirez-ripen-26325c4/.agents/skills/remedy/SKILL.md
- skill frankieramirez-ripen-26325c4/.agents/skills/reveal/SKILL.md
- skill frankieramirez-ripen-26325c4/.agents/skills/scan/SKILL.md
- skill frankieramirez-ripen-26325c4/.agents/skills/scry/SKILL.md
- skill frankieramirez-ripen-26325c4/.agents/skills/setup-mana/SKILL.md
- skill frankieramirez-ripen-26325c4/.agents/skills/sift/SKILL.md
- skill frankieramirez-ripen-26325c4/.agents/skills/ward/SKILL.md
- agent-rules frankieramirez-ripen-26325c4/AGENTS.md
- agent-rules frankieramirez-ripen-26325c4/CLAUDE.md
- agent-rules frankieramirez-ripen-26325c4/docs/agents.md
danger signals6
- suspicious bundled script suspicious bundled script frankieramirez-ripen-26325c4/.agents/skills/attune/scripts/tickets.sh :280
encoded=$(python3 -c 'import urllib.parse,sys; print(urllib.parse.quote(sys.argv[1]))' "$label") - suspicious bundled script suspicious bundled script frankieramirez-ripen-26325c4/.agents/skills/cast/scripts/tickets.sh :280
encoded=$(python3 -c 'import urllib.parse,sys; print(urllib.parse.quote(sys.argv[1]))' "$label") - suspicious bundled script suspicious bundled script frankieramirez-ripen-26325c4/.agents/skills/conjure/scripts/tickets.sh :280
encoded=$(python3 -c 'import urllib.parse,sys; print(urllib.parse.quote(sys.argv[1]))' "$label") - suspicious bundled script suspicious bundled script frankieramirez-ripen-26325c4/.agents/skills/scan/scripts/tickets.sh :280
encoded=$(python3 -c 'import urllib.parse,sys; print(urllib.parse.quote(sys.argv[1]))' "$label") - suspicious bundled script suspicious bundled script frankieramirez-ripen-26325c4/.agents/skills/setup-mana/scripts/tickets.sh :280
encoded=$(python3 -c 'import urllib.parse,sys; print(urllib.parse.quote(sys.argv[1]))' "$label") - suspicious bundled script suspicious bundled script frankieramirez-ripen-26325c4/.agents/skills/sift/scripts/tickets.sh :280
encoded=$(python3 -c 'import urllib.parse,sys; print(urllib.parse.quote(sys.argv[1]))' "$label")
Heuristic, inferred signals — false positives (legitimately powerful tools, forks, language ports) are expected. Treat each as "review this", not a verdict. See the ecosystem-wide picture on the security hub, or the fleet security of frankieramirez.