AI agent interaction security framework and MCP Tool Gateway — declared trust boundaries, signed two-key approvals, runtime reconciliation
- capability exposure inferred + 22
- recent drift inferred + 12
- tool safety inferred + 12
inferred
The A–E grade is our heuristic synthesis — a "review this" prompt, not a verdict. Each factor is tagged by what backs it: attested (a verifiable record), reported (a third party's claim), or inferred (our own heuristic, e.g. permissions). See methodology.
graded 8m ago · see ecosystem CVEs →
- B · 22 → C · 46
No known CVEs for this server.
- high dangerous code
committed secret: Stripe live key
analyzed commit 4c3d090 · analyzer v28 · 1d ago
danger signals3
- suspicious endpoint 169.254.169.254 (cloud metadata) jjongkwann-agent-interlock-4c3d090/tests/test_l1_matrix.py :431
server.metadata_redirect_location = "http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data" - suspicious endpoint 169.254.169.254 (cloud metadata) jjongkwann-agent-interlock-4c3d090/tests/test_mcp_oauth.py :146
("https://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data", frozenset({"169.254.169.254"})), - committed secret Stripe live key jjongkwann-agent-interlock-4c3d090/tests/l1_harness.py :61
sk_liv…(31 chars, redacted)
- recent drift +12 capability drift →
[](https://mcpobservatory.com/servers/github:jjongkwann/agent-interlock/security) Heuristic, inferred signals — false positives (legitimately powerful tools, forks, language ports) are expected. Treat each as "review this", not a verdict. See the ecosystem-wide picture on the security hub, or the fleet security of jjongkwann.