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- capability exposure inferred + 28
- recent drift inferred + 12
- tool safety inferred + 18
- trust mitigators mixed − 11
inferred mixed
The A–E grade is our heuristic synthesis — a "review this" prompt, not a verdict. Each factor is tagged by what backs it: attested (a verifiable record), reported (a third party's claim), or inferred (our own heuristic, e.g. permissions). See methodology.
grade last moved 10h ago · see ecosystem CVEs →
- B · 23 → C · 47
- B · 17 → B · 23
- B · 25 → B · 17
- B · 32 → B · 25
- C · 44 → B · 32
- C · 52 → C · 44
- D · 64 → C · 52
- D · 77 → D · 64
- D · 69 → D · 77
- C · 39 → D · 69
No known CVEs for this server.
- high hidden prompt content
1 file(s) with hidden prompt content: sidebutton-sidebutton-1d21564/packages/server/defaults/claude/CLAUDE.md (skill-exfil): "secret→sink: - Notion: send `Authorization: Bearer $N…
- low dangerous code
env-secret-flows-to-network-js: A process environment value reaches a network call. Review whether it is a credential leaving the process; the ordinary API-wrapper shape (read a ke
- low dangerous code
env-secret-flows-to-network-js: A process environment value reaches a network call. Review whether it is a credential leaving the process; the ordinary API-wrapper shape (read a ke
- low dangerous code
env-secret-flows-to-network-js: A process environment value reaches a network call. Review whether it is a credential leaving the process; the ordinary API-wrapper shape (read a ke
- low dangerous code
env-secret-flows-to-network-js: A process environment value reaches a network call. Review whether it is a credential leaving the process; the ordinary API-wrapper shape (read a ke
- low dangerous code
env-secret-flows-to-network-js: A process environment value reaches a network call. Review whether it is a credential leaving the process; the ordinary API-wrapper shape (read a ke
- low exfiltration combo set_basic_auth
single tool reads + sends: net, secrets
- low exfiltration combo clear_basic_auth
single tool reads + sends: net, secrets
- low exfiltration combo
sensitive read and network capabilities split across this server's tools
analyzed commit 1d21564 · analyzer v33 · 1d ago
skills & prompt files 2
- hidden: agent-rules: skill-exfil sidebutton-sidebutton-1d21564/packages/server/defaults/claude/CLAUDE.md :11
secret→sink: - Notion: send `Authorization: Bearer $NOTION_TOKEN` to `https://api.notion.com/v1` and pin `Notion-Version: 2026-03-11` on EVERY call — the header is required, and the version decides
- agent-rules sidebutton-sidebutton-1d21564/AGENTS.md
danger signals1
- suspicious endpoint 169.254.169.254 (cloud metadata) sidebutton-sidebutton-1d21564/packages/server/src/security.test.ts :98
'http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/',
- recent drift +12 capability drift →
[](https://mcpobservatory.com/servers/github:sidebutton/sidebutton/security) Heuristic, inferred signals — false positives (legitimately powerful tools, forks, language ports) are expected. Treat each as "review this", not a verdict. See the ecosystem-wide picture on the security hub, or the fleet security of sidebutton.