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- capability exposure inferred + 35
- supply-chain attested + 6
- trust mitigators mixed − 11
attested inferred mixed
The A–E grade is our heuristic synthesis — a "review this" prompt, not a verdict. Each factor is tagged by what backs it: attested (a verifiable record), reported (a third party's claim), or inferred (our own heuristic, e.g. permissions). See methodology.
graded 5m ago · see ecosystem CVEs →
- low dangerous code
env-secret-flows-to-network-js: A process environment value (often a secret/token) flows into a network call — possible credential exfiltration. (package/setup.js:360)
- low dangerous code
env-secret-flows-to-network-js: A process environment value (often a secret/token) flows into a network call — possible credential exfiltration. (package/setup.js:862)
- low dangerous code
env-secret-flows-to-network-js: A process environment value (often a secret/token) flows into a network call — possible credential exfiltration. (package/setup.js:888)
- low dangerous code
env-secret-flows-to-network-js: A process environment value (often a secret/token) flows into a network call — possible credential exfiltration. (package/setup.js:913)
- low dangerous code
env-secret-flows-to-network-js: A process environment value (often a secret/token) flows into a network call — possible credential exfiltration. (package/setup.js:955)
- low dangerous code
env-secret-flows-to-network-js: A process environment value (often a secret/token) flows into a network call — possible credential exfiltration. (package/setup.js:975)
- supply-chain +6 supply-chain hub →
Heuristic, inferred signals — false positives (legitimately powerful tools, forks, language ports) are expected. Treat each as "review this", not a verdict. See the ecosystem-wide picture on the security hub, or the fleet security of lanchuske.