MCP server that exposes PraisonAI tools for Claude Desktop, Cursor, and other MCP clients
- capability exposure inferred + 35
- tool safety inferred + 20
- trust mitigators mixed − 8
inferred mixed
The A–E grade is our heuristic synthesis — a "review this" prompt, not a verdict. Each factor is tagged by what backs it: attested (a verifiable record), reported (a third party's claim), or inferred (our own heuristic, e.g. permissions). See methodology.
grade last moved 6d ago · see ecosystem CVEs →
No known CVEs for this server.
- medium dangerous code
dynamic exec: eval()/exec()
- medium toxic flow (lethal trifecta)
lethal trifecta reachable across this server's tools: private-data access + untrusted-content ingestion + network exfil
- low exfiltration combo tavily_search
single tool reads + sends: net, secrets
- low exfiltration combo exa_search
single tool reads + sends: net, secrets
- low exfiltration combo ydc_search
single tool reads + sends: net, secrets
- low exfiltration combo duckduckgo_search
single tool reads + sends: net, secrets
- low exfiltration combo
sensitive read and network capabilities split across this server's tools
analyzed v0.1.1 · analyzer v33 · 4w ago
danger signals1
- dynamic code execution eval()/exec() praisonai_mcp-0.1.1/src/praisonai_mcp/tools.py :1156
exec(code, {"__builtins__": __builtins__}, local_vars)
Heuristic, inferred signals — false positives (legitimately powerful tools, forks, language ports) are expected. Treat each as "review this", not a verdict. See the ecosystem-wide picture on the security hub.